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SECRET SHARING AND SHARED INFORMATION
JOHANNES RAUH
Abstract. Secret sharing is a cryptographic discipline in which the goal is
to distribute information about a secret over a set of participants in such a
way that only specific authorized combinations of participants together can
reconstruct the secret. Thus, secret sharing schemes are systems of variables
in which it is very clearly specified which subsets have information about
the secret. As such, they provide perfect model systems for information
decompositions. However, following this intuition too far leads to an information
decomposition with negative partial information terms, which are difficult to
interpret. One possible explanation is that the partial information lattice
proposed by Williams and Beer is incomplete and has to be extended to
incorporate terms corresponding to higher order redundancy. These results
put bounds on information decompositions that follow the partial information
framework, and they hint at where the partial information lattice needs to be
improved.
1. Introduction
Williams and Beer (2010) have proposed a general framework to decompose
the multivariate mutual information I(S;X1, . . . , Xn) between a target random
variable S and predictor random variables X1, . . . , Xn into different terms (called
partial information terms) according to different ways in which combinations of
the variables X1, . . . , Xn provide unique, shared or synergistic information about S.
Williams and Beer argue that such a decomposition can be based on a measure of
shared information. The underlying idea is that any information can be classified
according to “who knows what.” But is this true?
A situation where the question “who knows what” is easy to answer very precisely
is secret sharing, a part of cryptography in which the goal is to distribute information
(the secret) over a set of participants such that the secret can only be reconstructed if
certain authorized combinations of the participants join their information (see Beimel
(2011) for a survey). The set of authorized combinations is called the access structure.
Formally, the secret is modelled as a random variable S, and a secret sharing scheme
assigns a random variable Xi to each participant i in such a way that, if {i1, . . . , ik}
is an authorized set of participants, then S is a function of Xi1 , . . . , Xik ; that
is, H(S|Xi1 , . . . , Xik) = 0; and, conversely, if {i1, . . . , ik} is not authorized, then
H(S|Xi1 , . . . , Xik) > 0. It is assumed that the participants know the scheme, and
so any authorized combination of participants can reconstruct the secret if they
join their information. A secret sharing scheme is perfect if non-authorized sets of
participants know nothing about the secret; i.e., H(S|Xi1 , . . . , Xik) = H(S). Thus,
in a perfect secret sharing scheme, it is very clearly specified “who knows what.” In
this sense, perfect secret sharing schemes provide model systems for which it should
be easy to write down an information decomposition.
One connection between secret sharing and information decompositions is that
the set of access structures of secret sharing schemes with n participants is in
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one-to-one correspondence with the partial information terms of Williams and Beer.
This correspondence makes it possible to give another interpretation to all partial
information terms: Namely, the partial information term is a measure of how similar
a given system of random variables is to a secret sharing scheme with a given access
structure.
This correspondence also allows to introduce the secret sharing property that
makes precise the above intuition: An information decomposition satisfies this
property if and only if any perfect secret sharing scheme has just a single partial
information term (which corresponds to its access structure). Lemma 2 states the
secret sharing property is implied by the Williams and Beer axioms, which shows that
the secret sharing property plays well together with the ideas of Williams and Beer.
Proposition 1 shows that in an information decomposition that satisfies a natural
generalization of this property, it is possible to prescribe arbitrary nonnegative
values to all partial information terms.
These results suggest that perfect secret sharing schemes fit well together with
the ideas of Williams and Beer. However, following this intuition too far leads to
inconsistencies. As Theorem 4 shows, extending the secret sharing property to pairs
of perfect secret sharing schemes leads to negative partial information terms. While
other authors have started to build an intuition for negative partial terms and argue
that they may be unavoidable in information decompositions, the concluding section
collects arguments against such claims and proposes as another possible solutions
that the Williams and Beer framework is incomplete and is missing nodes that
represent higher order redundancy.
Cryptography, where the goal is not only to transport information (as in coding
theory) but also to keep it concealed from unauthorized parties, has initiated many
interesting developments in information theory, for example, by introducing new
information measures and re-interpreting older ones; see, for example, Maurer and
Wolf (1997); Csiszar and Narayan (2004). This manuscript focuses on another
contribution of cryptography: probabilistic systems with well-defined distribution of
information.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes
definitions and results about secret sharing schemes. Section 3 introduces different
secret sharing properties that fix the values that a measure of shared information
assigns to perfect secret sharing schemes and combinations thereof. The main result
of Section 4 is that the pairwise secret sharing property leads to negative partial
information terms. Section 5 discusses the implications of this incompatibility result.
2. Perfect secret sharing schemes
We consider n participants among whom we want to distribute information about
a secret in such a way that we can control which subsets of participants together
can decrypt the secret.
Definition 1. An access structure A is a family of subsets of {1, . . . , n}, closed to
taking supersets. Elements of A are called authorized sets.
A secret sharing scheme with access structure A is a family of random variables
S, X1, . . . , Xn such that:
• H(XA, S) = H(XA), whenever A ∈ A.
Here, XA = (Xi)i∈A for all subsets A ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. A secret sharing scheme is
perfect if
• H(XA, S) = H(XA) +H(S), whenever A /∈ A.
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The condition for perfection is equivalent to H(S|XA) = H(S). See Beimel (2011)
for a survey on secret sharing.
Theorem 1. For any access structure A and any h > 0, there exists a perfect
secret sharing scheme with access structure A for which the entropy of the secret S
equals H(S) = h.
Proof. Perfect secret sharing schemes for arbitrary access structures were first
constructed by Ito et al. (1987). In this construction, the entropy of the secret
equals 1 bit. Combining n copies of such a secret sharing scheme gives a secret
sharing scheme with a secret of n bit. As explained in (Beimel, 2011, Claim 1), the
distribution of the secret may be perturbed arbitrarily (as long as the support of the
distribution remains the same). In this way it is possible to prescribe the entropy of
the secret in a perfect secret sharing scheme. 
Example 1. Let Y1, Y2, Y3, S be independent uniform binary random variables, and
let A = (Y1, Y2 ⊕ S), B = (Y2, Y3 ⊕ S), C = (Y3, Y1 ⊕ S), where ⊕ denotes addition
modulo 2 (or the XOR operation). Then (S,A,B,C) is a perfect secret sharing
scheme with access structure
{A,B}, {A,C}, {B,C}, {A,B,C}.
It may be of little surprise that integer addition modulo k is an important building
block in many secret sharing schemes.
While existence of perfect secret sharing schemes is solved, there remains the
problem of finding efficient secret sharing schemes in the sense that the variables
X1, . . . , Xn should be as small as possible (in the sense of a small entropy), given a
fixed entropy of the secret. For instance, in Example 1, H(Xi)/H(S) = 2 for all i.
See Beimel (2011) for a survey.
Since an access structure A is closed to taking supersets, it is uniquely determined
by its inclusion-minimal elements
A := {A ∈ A : if B ⊆ A and B 6= A, then B /∈ A}.
For instance, in Example 1, the first three elements belong to A. The set A has
the property that no element of A is a subset of another element of A. Such a
collection of sets is called an antichain. Conversely, any such antichain equals the
set of inclusion-minimal elements of a unique access structure.
The antichains have a natural lattice structure, which was used by Williams and
Beer to order the different values of shared information and organize them into what
they call the partial information lattice. The same lattice also has a description in
terms of secret sharing.
Definition 2. Let (A1, . . . , Ak) and (B1, . . . , Bl) be antichains. Then
(A1, . . . , Ak)  (B1, . . . , Bl) :⇐⇒ for any Bi there exists Aj with Aj ⊆ Bi.
The partial information lattice for the case n = 3 is depicted in Figure 1.
Lemma 1. Let A be an access structure on {1, . . . , n}, and let (B1, . . . , Bl) be an
antichain. Then B1, . . . , Bl are all authorized for A if and only if A  (B1, . . . , Bl).
Proof. The statement directly follows from the definitions. 
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3. Information decompositions of secret sharing schemes
Williams and Beer (2010) proposed to decompose the total mutual informa-
tion I(S;X1, . . . , Xn) between a target random variable S and predictor random
variables X1, . . . , Xn according to different ways in which combinations of the
variables X1, . . . , Xn provide unique, shared or synergistic information about S.
One of their main ideas is to base such a decomposition on a single measure of
shared information I∩, which is a function I(S;Y1, . . . , Yk) that takes as argu-
ments a list of random variables, of which the first, S, takes a special role. To
arrive at a decomposition of I(S;X1, . . . , Xn), the variables Y1, . . . , Yk are taken
to be combinations XA = (Xi)i∈A of X1, . . . , Xn, corresponding to subsets A of
{1, . . . , n}. For simplicity, I∩(S;XA1 , . . . , XAk) is denoted by I∩(S;A1, . . . , Ak) for
all A1, . . . , Ak ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
Williams and Beer proposed a list of axioms that such a measure I∩ should satisfy.
It follows from these axioms that it suffices to consider the function I∩(S;A1, . . . , Ak)
in the case that (A1, . . . , Ak) is an antichain. Moreover, I∩(S; ·) is a monotone
function on the partial information lattice (Definition 2). Thus it is natural to write
each value I∩(S;A1, . . . , Ak) on the lattice as a sum of local terms I∂ corresponding
to the antichains that lie below (A1, . . . , Ak) in the lattice:
I∩(S;A1, . . . , Ak) =
∑
(B1,...,Bl)(A1,...,Ak)
I∂(S;B1, . . . , Bl).
The terms I∂ are called partial information terms. This representation always exists,
and the partial information terms are uniquely defined (using a Mo¨bius inversion).
However, it is not guaranteed that I∂ is always nonnegative. If I∂ is nonnegative,
then I∩ is called locally positive.
Williams and Beer also defined a function denoted by Imin that satisfies their
axioms and that is locally positive. While the framework is intriguing and has
attracted a lot of further research (as this special issue illustrates), the function
Imin has been critiziced as not measuring the right thing. The difficulty of finding a
reasonable measure of shared information that is locally positive (Bertschinger et al.,
2013; Rauh et al., 2014) has led some to argue that maybe local positivity is not
a necessary requirement for an information decomposition. This issue is discussed
further in Section 5.
The goal of this section is to present additional natural properties for a measure of
shared information that relate secret sharing with the intuition behind information
decompositions. In a perfect secret sharing scheme, any combination of participants
knows either nothing or everything about S. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 3. A measure of shared information I∩ has the secret sharing property
if and only if for any access structure A and any perfect secret sharing scheme
(X1, . . . , Xn, S) with access structure A, the following holds:
I∩(S;A1, . . . , Ak) =
{
H(S), if A1, . . . , Ak are all authorized,
0, otherwise,
for any A1, . . . , Ak ⊆ {X1, . . . , Xn}.
Lemma 2. The secret sharing property is implied by the Williams and Beer axioms.
Proof. The Williams and Beer axioms imply that
I∩(S;A1, . . . , Ak) ≤ I(S;Ai) = 0
whenever Ai is not authorized. On the other hand, when A1, . . . , Ak are all autho-
rized, then the monotonicity axiom implies
I∩(S;A1, . . . , Ak) ≥ I∩(S;A1, . . . , Ak, S) = I∩(S;S) = H(S). 
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Perfect secret sharing schemes lead to information decompositions with a single
nonzero partial information term:
Lemma 3. If I∩ has the secret sharing property and if (X1, . . . , Xn, S) is a perfect
secret sharing scheme with access structure A, then
(1) I∂(S;A1, . . . , Ak) =
{
H(S), if A = {A1, . . . , Ak},
0, otherwise,
for any A1, . . . , Ak ⊆ {X1, . . . , Xn}.
Proof. Suppose that A = {A′1, . . . , A′k′}, and let J∂(S;A1, . . . , Ak) be the right hand
side of (1). We need to show that I∂ = J∂ . Since the Mo¨bius inversion is unique, it
suffices to show that J∩ = I∩, where
J∩(S;A1, . . . , Ak) =
∑
(B1,...,Bl)(A1,...,Ak)
J∂(S;B1, . . . , Bl).
By Lemma 1,
J∩(S;A1, . . . , Ak) =
{
H(S), if A1, . . . , Ak are all authorized,
0, otherwise,
for any A1, . . . , Ak ⊆ {X1, . . . , Xn}, from which the claim follows. 
What happens when we have several secret sharing schemes involving the same
participants? In order to have a clear intuition, assume that the secret sharing
schemes satisfy the following definition:
Definition 4. Let A1, . . . ,Al be access structures on {1, . . . , n}. A combination
of (perfect) secret sharing schemes with access structures A1, . . . ,Al consists of
random variables S1, . . . , Sl, X1, . . . , Xn such that (Si, X1, . . . , Xn) is a (perfect)
secret sharing scheme with access structure Ai for i = 1, . . . , l and such that
H(Si|S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sl, XA) = H(Si) if A /∈ Ai.
This definition ensures that the secrets are independent in the sense that knowing
some of the secrets provides no information about the other secrets. Formally, one
can see that the secrets are probabilistically independent as follows: For any A /∈ Ai
(for example, A = ∅),
H(Si|S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sl) ≥ H(Si|S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sl, XA) = H(Si).
In Definition 4, if two access structures Ai,Aj are identical, then we can replace
Si and Sj by a single random variable (Si, Sj) and obtain a smaller combination of
(perfect) secret sharing schemes.
In a combination of perfect secret sharing schemes, it is very clear who knows
what: Namely, a group of participants knows all secrets for which it is authorized,
while it knows nothing about the remaining secrets. This motivates the following
definition:
Definition 5. A measure of shared information I∩ has the combined secret sharing
property if and only if for any combination of perfect secret sharing schemes with
access structures A1, . . . ,Al,
(2) I∩
(
(S1, . . . , Sl);A1, . . . , Ak
)
= H
({Si : A1, . . . , Ak ∈ Ai})
(the entropy of those secrets for which A1, . . . , Ak are all authorized). I∩ has the
pairwise secret sharing property if and only if the same holds true in the special
case l = 2.
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The combined secret sharing property implies the pairwise secret sharing property.
The pairwise secret sharing property does not follow from the Williams and Beer
axioms. For example, Imin satisfies the Williams and Beer axioms, but not the
pairwise secret sharing property (as will become apparent in Theorem 2). So one can
ask whether the pairwise and combined secret sharing properties are compatible with
the Williams and Beer axioms. This question is difficult to answer, since currently
there are only two proposed measures of shared information that satisfy the Williams
and Beer axioms, namely Imin and the minimum of mutual informations (Barrett,
2014)
IMMI(S;A1, . . . , Ak) := min
i=1,...,k
I(S;Ai).
Both measures do not satisfy the pairwise secret sharing property.
While there has been no further proposal for a function that satisfies the Williams
and Beer axioms for arbitrarily many arguments, several measures have been
proposed for the “bivariate case” k = 2, notably Ired of Harder et al. (2013) and
S˜I of Bertschinger et al. (2014). The appendix shows that S˜I at least satisfies the
combined secret sharing property “as far as possible.”
Combinations of l perfect secret sharing schemes lead to information decomposi-
tions with at most l nonzero partial information terms.
Lemma 4. Assume that I∩ has the combined secret sharing property. If (S1, . . . , Sl,
X1, . . . , Xn) is a combination of perfect secret sharing schemes with pairwise different
access structures A1, . . . ,Al, then
I∂
(
(S1, . . . , Sl);A1, . . . , Ak
)
=

H(Si), if Ai = {A1, . . . , Ak}
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , l},
0, otherwise,
for any A1, . . . , Ak ⊆ {X1, . . . , Xn}.
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3 and omitted.
The combined secret sharing property implies that any combination of nonnegative
values can be prescribed as partial information values.
Proposition 1. Suppose that a nonnegative number hA is given for any antichain A.
For any measure of shared information that satisfies the combined secret sharing
property, there exist random variables S,X1, . . . , Xn such that the corresponding
partial measure I∂ satisfies I∂(S;A1, . . . , Ak) = hA1,...,Ak for all antichains A =
(A1, . . . , Ak).
Proof. By Theorem 1, for each antichain A there exists a perfect secret sharing
scheme SA, X1,A, . . . , Xn,A with H(SA) = hA. Combine independent copies of
these perfect secret sharing schemes and let
S = (SA)A, X1 = (X1,A)A, . . . , Xn = (Xn,A)A,
where A runs over all antichains. Then S,X1, . . . , Xn is an independent combination
of perfect secret sharing schemes, and the statement follows from Lemma 4. 
Unfortunately, not every random variable S can be decomposed in such a way as a
combination of secret sharing schemes. However, Proposition 1 suggests that, given a
measure I∩ of shared information that satisfies the combined secret sharing property,
I∂(S;A) can informally be interpreted as a measure that quantifies how much
(X1, . . . , Xn, S) looks like a perfect secret sharing scheme with access structure A.
Lemma 5. Suppose that I∩ is a measure of shared information that satisfies the
pairwise secret sharing property. If X1 and X2 are independent, then
I∩
(
(X1, X2);X1, X2
)
= 0.
SECRET SHARING AND SHARED INFORMATION 7
In the language of Ince (2017), the lemma says that the pairwise secret sharing
property implies the independent identity property.
Proof. Let S1 = X1, S2 = X2. Then S1, S2, X1, X2 is a pair of perfect secret sharing
schemes with access structures A1 =
{{1}} and A2 = {{2}}. The statement follows
from Definition 5, since X1 is not authorized for A2 and X2 is not authorized
for A1. 
4. Incompatibility with local positivity
Unfortunately, although the combined secret sharing property very much fits
the intuition behind the axioms of Williams and Beer, it is incompatible with a
nonnegative decomposition according to the partial information lattice:
Theorem 2. Let I∩ be a measure of shared information that satisfies the Williams-
Beer axioms and has the pairwise secret sharing property. Then I∂ is not nonnegative.
Proof. The XOR example, which was already used by Bertschinger et al. (2013)
and Rauh et al. (2014) to prove incompatibility results for properties of information
decompositions, can also be used here.
Let X1, X2 be independent binary uniform random variables, let X3 = X1 ⊕X2,
and let S = (X1, X2, X3). Observe that the situation is symmetric in X1, X2, X3.
In particular, X2, X3 are also independent, and X1 = X2⊕X3. The following values
of I∩ can be computed from the assumptions:
• I∩
(
S;X1, (X2X3)
)
= I∩
(
S;X1, (X1X2X3)
)
= I∩(S;X1) = 1 bit, since X1
is a function of (X2, X3) and by the monotonicity axiom.
• I∩(S;X1, X2) = I∩
(
(X1X2X3);X1, X2
)
= I∩
(
(X1X2);X1, X2
)
= 0 by
Lemma 5.
By monotonicity, I∩(S;X1, X2, X3) = 0. Moreover,
I∩
(
S; (X1X2), (X1X3), (X2X3)
) ≤ 2 bit,
since 2 bit is the total entropy in the system. But then
I∂
(
S; (X1X2), (X1X3), (X2X3)
)
= I∩
(
S; (X1X2), (X1X3), (X2X3)
)
− I∩
(
S;X1, (X2X3)
)− I∩(S;X2, (X1X3))− I∩(S;X3, (X1X2))± 0
≤ 2 bit− 3 bit = −1 bit,
where ±0 denotes values of I∩ that vanish. Thus, I∂ is not nonnegative. 
Note that the random variables (S = (X1, X2, X3), X1, X2, X3) from the proof of
Theorem 2 form three perfect secret sharing schemes that do not satisfy the definition
of a combination of perfect secret sharing schemes. The three secrets X1, X2, X3
are not independent, but they are pair-wise independent (and so Lemma 4 does not
apply).
Remark 1. The XOR example from the proof of Theorem 2 (which was already used
by Bertschinger et al. (2013) and Rauh et al. (2014)) was criticized by Chicharro
and Panzeri (2017) on the grounds that it involves random variables that stand in
a deterministic functional relation (in the sense that X3 = X1 ⊕X2). Chicharro
and Panzeri argue that in such a case it is not appropriate to use the full partial
information lattice. Instead, the functional relationship should be used to eliminate
(or identify) nodes from the lattice. Thus, while the monotonicity axiom of Williams
and Beer implies I∩(S;X3, (X2, X3)) = I∩(S;X3) (and so {3; 23} is not part of the
partial information lattice), the same axiom also implies that I∩(S;X3, (X1, X2)) =
I∩(S;X3) in the XOR example, and so {3; 12} should similarly be excluded from
the lattice when analyzing this particular example. But note that the first argument
8 JOHANNES RAUH
{123} : 2
{12} : 2 {13} : 2 {23} : 2
{12}{13} : 2 {12}{23} : 2 {13}{23} : 2
{1} : 1 {2} : 1 {3} : 1 {12}{13}{23} : ?
{1}{23} : 1 {2}{13} : 1 {3}{12} : 1
{1}{2} : 0 {1}{3} : 0 {2}{3} : 0
{1}{2}{3} : ?
Figure 1. The partial information lattice for n = 3. Each
node is indexed by an antichain. The values (in bit) of the shared
information in the XOR example from the proof of Theorem 2
according to the pairwise secret sharing property are given after
the colon.
is a formal argument that is valid for all joint distributions of S,X1, X2, X3, while
the second argument takes into account the particular underlying distribution.
It is easy to work around this objection. The deterministic relationship disappears
when an arbitrarily small stochastic noise is added to the joint distribution. To be
precise, let X1, X2 be independent binary random variables, and let X3 be binary
with
P (X3 = x3|X1 = x1, X2 = x2) =
{
1− , if x3 = x1 ⊕ x2,
, otherwise,
for 0 ≤  ≤ 1. For  = 0, the example from the proof is recovered. Assuming that
the partial information terms depend continuously on this joint distribution, the
partial information term I∂
(
S; (X1X2), (X1X3), (X2X3)
)
will still be negative for
small  > 0. Thus, assuming continuity, the conclusion of Theorem 2 still holds
true when the information decomposition according to the full partial information
lattice is only considered for random variables that do not satisfy any functional
deterministic constraint.
Remark 2. Analyzing the proof of Theorem 2, one sees that the independent identity
axiom (Lemma 5) is the main ingredient to arrive at the contradiction. The same
property also arises in the other uses of the XOR example (Bertschinger et al., 2013;
Rauh et al., 2014).
5. Discussion
Perfect secret sharing schemes correspond to systems of random variables in which
it is very clearly specified “who knows what.” In such a system, it is easy to assign
intuitive values to the shared information nodes in the partial information lattice, and
one may conjecture that the intuition behind this assignment is the same intuition
that underlies the Williams and Beer axioms, which define the partial information
lattice. Moreover, following the same intuition, independent combinations of perfect
secret sharing schemes can be used as a tool to construct systems of random variables
with prescribable (nonnegative) values of partial information.
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Unfortunately, this extension to independent combinations of perfect secret
sharing schemes is not without problems: By Theorem 2, it leads to decompositions
with negative partial information terms. But what does it mean that the examples
derived from the same intuition as the Williams and Beer axioms contradict the
same axioms in this way? Is this an indication that the whole idea of information
decomposition does not work (and that the question posed in the first paragraph of
the introduction cannot be answered affirmatively)?
There are several ways out of this dilemma. The first solution is to assign different
values to combinations of perfect secret sharing schemes. This solution will not be
pursued further in this text, as it would change the interpretation of the information
decomposition as measuring “who knows what.”
The second solution is to accept negative partial values in the information
decomposition. It has been argued that negative values of information can be given
an intuitive interpretation in terms of confusing or misleading information. For
event-wise (also called “local”) information quantities, such as the event-wise mutual
information i(s;x) = log(p(s)/p(s|x)), this interpretation goes back to the early
days of information theory Fano (1961). Sometimes, this phenomenon is called
“misinformation” (Ince, 2017; Wibral et al., 2015). However, in the usual language,
misinformation refers to “false or incorrect information, especially when it is intended
to trick someone” Macmillan Publishers Limited (retrieved on 2017/10/05), which
is not the effect that is modelled here. Thus, the word misinformation should be
avoided, in order not to mislead the reader into the wrong intuition.
While negative event-wise information quantities are well-understood, the sit-
uation is more problematic for average quantities. When an agent receives side-
information in the form of the value x of a relevant random variable X, she changes
her strategy. While the prior strategy should be based on the prior distribution p(S),
the new strategy should be based on the posterior p(S|X = x). Clearly, in a
probabilistic setting, any change of strategy can lead to a better or worse result
in a single instance. On average, though, side-information never hurts (and it is
never advantageous on average to ignore side-information), which is why the mutual
information is never negative. Similarly, it is natural to expect non-negativity of
other information quantities. It is difficult to imagine how correct side-information
(or an aspect thereof) can be misleading on average. The situation is different for
incorrect information, where the interpretation of a negative value is much easier.
More conceptually, I would suspect that an (averaged) information quantity that
may change its sign actually conflates different aspects of information1, just as the in-
teraction information (or co-information) conflates synergy and redundancy Williams
and Beer (2010).
In any case, allowing negative partial values alters the interpretation of an
information decomposition to a point where it is questionable whether the word
“decomposition” is still appropriate. When decomposing an object into parts, the
parts should in some reasonable way be sub-objects. For example, in a Fourier
decomposition of a function, the Fourier components are never larger than the
function (in the sense of the L2-norm), and the sum of the squared L2-norms of the
Fourier coefficients equals the squared L2-norm of the original function. As another
example, given a (positive) amount of money and two investment options, it may
indeed be possible to invest a negative share of the total amount into one of the
two options in order to increase the funds that can be invested in the second option.
1One can argue whether the same should be true for event-wise quantities. Recently, Ince
(2017) suggested to also write the event-wise mutual information as a difference of non-negative
quantities.
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However, such short selling is regulated in many countries with much stronger rules
than ordinary trading.
I do not claim that an information decomposition with negative partial information
terms cannot possibly make sense. However, it has to be made clear precisely how
to interpret negative terms, and it is important to distinguish between correct
information that leads to a suboptimal decision due to unlikely events happening
(“bad luck”) and incorrect information that leads to decisions being based on the
wrong posterior probabilities (as opposed to the “correct” conditional probabilities).
A third solution is to change the underlying lattice structure of the decomposition.
A first step in this direction was done by Chicharro and Panzeri (2017) who propose
to decompose mutual information according to subsets of the partial information
lattice. However, it is also conceivable that the lattice has to be enlarged.
Williams and Beer derived the partial information lattice from their axioms
together with the assumption that everything can be expressed in terms of shared
information (that is, according to “who knows what”). Shared information is
sometimes equivalently called redundant information, but it may be necessary to
distinguish the two. Information that is shared by several random variables is
information that is accessible to each single random variable, but redundancy can
also arise at higher orders. An example is the infamous XOR example from the
proof of Theorem 2: In this example, each pair Xi, Xj is independent and contains
of two bits, but the total system X1, X2, X3 has only two bits. Therefore, there
is one bit of redundancy. However, this redundancy bit is not located anywhere
specifically: It is not contained in either of X1, X2, X3, and thus it is not shared
information. Since the redundant bit is not part of X1, it is not “shared” by X1 in
this sense. This phenomenon corresponds to the fact that random variables can be
pairwise independent without being independent.
This kind of higher order redundancy does not have a place in the partial
information lattice, so it may be that nodes corresponding to higher order redundancy
have to be added. When the lattice is enlarged in this way, the structure of the Mo¨bius
inversion is changed, and it is possible that the resulting lattice leads to nonnegative
partial information terms, without changing those cumulative information values
that are already present in the original lattice. If this approach succeeds, the
answer to the question from the introduction will be negative: Simply classifying
information according to “who knows what” (i.e. shared information) does not work,
since it does not capture higher order redundancy. The analysis of extensions of the
partial information lattice is scope for future work.
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Appendix A. Combined secret sharing properties for small k
This section discusses the defining equation (2) of the combined secret sharing
property for k = 1 and k = 2. The case k = 1 is incorporated in the definition
of a combination of perfect secret sharing schemes: The following lemma implies
that any measure of shared information that satisfies self-redundancy satisfies (2)
for k = 1. Recall that Williams and Beer’s self-redundancy axiom implies that
I∩(S;XA) = I(S;XA).
Lemma 6. Let (S1, . . . , Sl, X1, . . . , Xn) be a combination of perfect secret sharing
schemes with access structures A1, . . . ,Al. Then
I
(
(S1, . . . , Sl);XA
)
= H
({Si : A ∈ Ai}).
Proof. Suppose that the secret for which A is authorized are S1, . . . , Sm. Then
H(S1, . . . , Sl|XA) = H(S1, . . . , Sm|XA) +H(Sm+1, . . . , Sl|S1, . . . , Sm, XA)
= H(Sm+1, . . . , Sl|S1, . . . , Sm, XA) ≤ H(Sm+1, . . . , Sl) ≤
l∑
i=m+1
H(Si).
On the other hand,
H(Sm+1, . . . , Sl|S1, . . . , Sm, XA) =
l∑
i=m+1
H(Si|S1, . . . , Si−1, XA)
≥
l∑
i=m+1
H(Si|S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sl, XA) =
l∑
i=m+1
H(Si).
By independence (remark after Definition 4),
∑l
i=m+1H(Si) = H(Sm+1, . . . , Sl)
and
∑m
i=1H(Si) = H(S1, . . . , Sm). Thus,
I
(
(S1, . . . , Sl);XA
)
= H(S1, . . . , Sl)−H(S1, . . . , Sl|XA) = H(S1, . . . , Sm). 
The next result shows that the bivariate measure of shared information S˜I(S;X,Y )
proposed by Bertschinger et al. (2014) satisfies Eq. (2) for k ≤ 2. The reader is
referred to loc. cit. for definitions and elementary properties of S˜I.
Proposition 2. Let (S1, . . . , Sl, X1, . . . , Xn) be a combination of perfect secret
sharing schemes with access structures A1, . . . ,Al, Then
S˜I
(
(S1, . . . , Sl);XA1 , XA2
)
= H
({Si : A ∈ A1 ∩ A2}).
Proof. For given A1, A2, suppose that S1, . . . , Sm are the secrets for which at least
one of A1 or A2 is authorized and that Sm+1, . . . , Sl are the secrets for which neither
A1 nor A2 is authorized alone.
Let P be the joint distribution of S1, . . . , Sl, XA1 , XA2 . Let ∆P be the set of
alternative joint distributions for S1, . . . , Sl, XA1 , XA2 that have the same marginal
distributions as P on the subsets (S1, . . . , Sl, XA1) and (S1, . . . , Sl, XA2). According
to the definition of S˜I, we need to compare P with the elements of ∆P and find the
maximum of HQ
(
(S1, . . . , Sl)
∣∣XA1 , XA2) over Q ∈ ∆P , where the subscript to H
indicates with respect to which of these joint distributions the conditional entropy
is evaluated.
Define a distribution Q∗ for S1, . . . , Sl, XA1 , XA2 by
Q∗(s1, . . . , sl, x1, x2) = P (s1, . . . , sl)P (xA1 = x1|s1, . . . , sl)P (xA2 = x2|s1, . . . , sl).
Then Q∗ ∈ ∆P . Under P , the secrets Sm+1, . . . , Sl are independent of XA1
(marginally) and independent of XA2 , and so Sm+1, . . . , Sl are independent of
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the pair (XA1 , XA2) under Q
∗. On the other hand, S1, . . . , Sm are a function of
either XA1 or XA2 under P , and so S1, . . . , Sm is a function of (XA1 , XA2) under Q
∗.
Thus,
HQ∗(S1, . . . , Sl|XA1 , XA2) = HQ∗(Sm+1, . . . , Sl) = HP (Sm+1, . . . , Sl).
On the other hand, under any joint distribution Q ∈ ∆P , the secrets S1, . . . , Sm are
functions of XA1 , XA2 , whence
HQ(S1, . . . , Sl|XA1 , XA2) ≤ HQ(Sm+1, . . . , Sl) = HP (Sm+1, . . . , Sl).
It follows that Q∗ solves the optimization problem in the definition of S˜I.
Suppose that the secrets for which XA1 is authorized are S1, . . . , Sr and that
the secrets for which XA2 is authorized are Ss, . . . , Sm (with 1 ≤ r, s ≤ m). One
computes
IQ∗
(
(S1, . . . , Sl);XA1
∣∣XA2) = H(S1, . . . , Ss−1) = s−1∑
i=1
H(Si) and
IQ∗
(
(S1, . . . , Sl);XA1
)
= H(S1, . . . , Sr) =
r∑
i=1
H(Si),
whence
S˜I
(
(S1, . . . , Sl);XA1 , XA2
)
= IQ∗
(
(S1, . . . , Sl);XA1
)− IQ∗((S1, . . . , Sl);XA1∣∣XA2)
=
r∑
i=s
H(Si) = H(Ss, . . . , Sr). 
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